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Abstract 
Economic evaluations of alternative electric generating technologies typically rely on comparisons 
between their expected life-cycle production costs per unit of electricity supplied. The standard life-
cycle cost metric utilized is the “levelized cost” per MWh supplied. This paper demonstrates that this 
metric is inappropriate for comparing intermittent generating technologies like wind and solar with 
dispatchable generating technologies like nuclear, gas combined cycle, and coal. Levelized cost 
comparisons are a misleading metric for comparing intermittent and dispatchable generating 
technologies because they fail to take into account differences in the production profiles of intermittent 
and dispatchable generating technologies and the associated large variations in the market value of the 
electricity they supply. Levelized cost comparisons overvalue intermittent generating technologies 
compared to dispatchable base load generating technologies. These comparisons also typically 
overvalue wind generating technologies compared to solar generating technologies. Integrating 
differences in production profiles, the associated variations in the market value of the electricity at the 
times it is supplied, and the expected life-cycle costs associated with different generating technologies 
is necessary to provide meaningful economic comparisons between them. This market-based 
framework also has implications for the appropriate design of procurement auctions created to 
implement renewable energy procurement mandates, the efficient structure of production tax credits 
for renewable energy, incentives for and the evaluation of electricity storage technologies and the 
evaluation of the additional costs of integrating intermittent generation into electric power networks. 
Keywords 
Levelized cost comparisons; Production profiles; Intermittent generating technologies; Design of 
procurement auctions. 
JEL: L51, L94 
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Introduction and Summary* 
This paper makes a very simple point regarding the proper methods for comparing the economic value 
of intermittent generating technologies (e.g. wind and solar) with the economic value of traditional 
dispatchable generating technologies (e.g. CCGT, coal, nuclear). I show that the prevailing approach 
that relies on comparisons of the “levelized cost” per MWh supplied by different generating 
technologies, or any other measure of total life-cycle production costs per MWh supplied, is seriously 
flawed. It is flawed because it effectively treats all MWhs supplied as a homogeneous product 
governed by the law of one price. Specifically, traditional levelized cost comparisons fail to take 
account of the fact that the value (wholesale market price) of electricity supplied varies widely over 
the course of a typical year. The difference between the high and the low hourly prices over the course 
of a typical year, including capacity payments for generating capacity available to supply power 
during critical peak hours, can be up to four orders of magnitude (Joskow 2008). It is important to take 
wholesale market price variations into account because the hourly output profiles, and the associated 
market value of electricity supplied, of intermittent generating technologies and competing 
dispatchable generating technologies can be very different. Moreover, different intermittent generating 
technologies (e.g. wind vs. solar) also can have very different hourly production and market value 
profiles, and indeed, specific intermittent generating units using the same technology (e.g. wind) may 
have very different production profiles depending on where they are located.1 Wholesale electricity 
prices reach extremely high levels for a relatively small number of hours each year (see Figure 1) and 
generating units that are not able to supply electricity to balance supply and demand at those times are 
(or should be) at an economic disadvantage. These high-priced hours account for a large fraction of 
the quasi-rents that allow investors in generating capacity to recover their investment costs (Joskow 
2008) and failing properly to account for output during these critical hours will lead to incorrect 
economic evaluations of different generating technologies.  
In a nutshell, electricity that can be supplied by a wind generator at a levelized cost of 6¢/KWh is 
not “cheap” if the output is available primarily at night when the market value of electricity is only 
2.5¢/KWh. Similarly, a combustion turbine with a low expected capacity factor and a levelized cost of 
25¢/KWh is not necessarily “expensive” if it can be called on reliably to supply electricity during all 
hours when the market price is greater than 25¢/KWh. 
I use a simple set of numerical examples that are representative of actual variations in production 
and market value profiles to show that intermittent and dispatchable generating technologies with 
identical levelized total costs per MWh supplied can have very different economic values due to 
differences in the economic value of the electricity they produce. I will also argue that the failure of 
life-cycle cost comparisons between intermittent and dispatchable generating technologies to yield 
meaningful comparisons of economic value does not plague comparisons between different 
dispatchable “base load” generating technologies for which levelized cost comparisons were originally 
developed and applied. This is the case because the economic value of the output produced by 
different dispatchable base load generating technologies is likely to be the same because their output 
profiles are likely to be the same. The extension and use of levelized cost comparisons to intermittent 
generation has been a mistake and tends to implicitly overvalue intermittent generating technologies 
                                                     
* I am grateful to John Parsons, Denny Ellerman, Bill Hogan, Frank Wolak, and Catherine Wolfram for comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. The views expressed here are my own and do not represent the views of the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation, MIT, or any other organization with which I am affiliated- http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5860. 
1 We observe such a large variation in wholesale electricity prices because the demand for electricity varies widely over 
the hours of the year, electricity cannot be stored economically for most uses, and electricity demand and supply must be 
balanced continuously to maintain the reliability of the network. 
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compared to dispatchable alternatives.2 This problem is easily remedied by integrating generation 
output profiles for each technology with the associated expected market value of the output that will 
be supplied by each technology along with their respective lifecycle productions costs. 
Most of the current work on intermittent generating technologies, especially wind, has focused on 
the short-term network operating challenges and associated costs created by rapid swings in output, 
wide variations in output from one day to the next, and the difficulties of controlling output consistent 
with balancing supply and demand efficiently and meeting network reliability criteria, in the context 
of expected large scale entry of wind and/or solar generating capacity. That work assumes that large 
amounts of intermittent generating capacity will seek to be interconnected to transmission (or 
distribution) networks due to public policies aimed at promoting the rapid increase of intermittent 
renewable electricity supplies. It then examines the operational challenges and additional costs that 
adding large quantities of intermittent renewable generation to the network entails. This work is 
reasonably well advanced, though more needs to be done. Thus, this paper is not about the costs of 
integrating large quantities of intermittent generation into electric power networks. These costs can be 
substantial and further undermine the economics of intermittent generation. 
This paper focuses on a more basic set of questions. How do we properly measure the economic 
value of additional investments in intermittent generating technologies compared to dispatchable 
generating technologies? Among other things, proper methods to answer this question are necessary: 
(a) to properly evaluate the costs and benefits of subsidies and mandates aimed at promoting certain 
intermittent generating technologies and (b) since the promotion of intermittent renewable 
technologies is often motivated by a desire to reduce CO2 emissions, to properly measure the costs per 
unit of CO2 avoided by policies that favor intermittent generating technologies like wind and solar. 
Applying more accurate evaluation frameworks makes it possible transparently to compare the cost of 
reducing CO2 emissions using renewable energy subsidies and mandates with the cost of reducing CO2 
emissions in other ways (e.g. promoting energy efficiency, investments in nuclear power). Though it is 
not the focus of this paper, the proposed “market valuation” enhancement to levelized cost 
comparisons that I will propose also provides a consistent framework for evaluating the short run 
technical and economic issues associated with integrating large amounts of intermittent generating 
technology into electric power networks since the resolution of these issues must take into account the 
output profiles of intermittent generating technologies as well. Finally, I do not opine here on whether 
the policies for promoting renewable generating technologies are good or bad, but focus on the 
appropriate methods for evaluating their costs and benefits. 
Background 
The federal government and many states have adopted policies to promote the development of various 
renewable energy technologies for generating electricity. These policies include tax subsidies, direct 
subsidies, loan guarantees, marketable renewable energy credits, renewable energy purchase mandates 
imposed on distribution utilities to purchase a specified fraction of the electricity they sell to retail 
consumers from qualifying renewable electricity generation technologies, and long-term contracting 
requirements for renewable electricity suppliers that are not applicable to non-renewable generation 
sources.3 The primary renewable generating technologies of interest to utilities to meet regulatory 
                                                     
2 Exactly the same mistake is associated with “stacking” of levelized cost calculations from lowest to highest to create 
“supply curves” for reducing CO2 emissions by increasing the penetration low-carbon electricity generation technologies, 
including nuclear and carbon capture and sequestration, along with end-use electricity efficiency improvements. 
3 The primary federal incentive is a 10-year 2.1 cent/kWh production tax credit (adjusted annually by the rate of inflation) 
for each kWh of electricity supplied by a qualifying renewable energy plant. (For wind generators that go into service in 
2009 and 2010 an alternative subsidy framework is available.) About 30 states have adopted “renewable energy portfolio 
standards” that require electric distribution utilities to purchase specified fractions of the generation they require to serve 
retail consumers (e.g. 20%) by a certain date, regardless of the associated prices they must pay. If the mandates are 
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obligations and to respond to political pressure are wind-turbine generation and various solar electric 
generating technologies and I will focus on those technologies here.4 The primary motivation for these 
policies is to facilitate the development of no or low carbon electricity generation technologies in 
addition to or in lieu of placing a price on CO2 emissions and/or, as now seems most likely, 
administrative regulation of CO2 emissions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
There has been a great deal of discussion and analysis of the technical challenges that must be 
confronted effectively to integrate large quantities of intermittent renewable energy technologies --- 
wind and solar in particular --- into electric power networks (e.g. USDOE (pp. 62-67), NERC, 
ERCOT, NYISO, Mount et. al.). In a number of cases the technical analyses have been accompanied 
by estimates of the additional costs of integrating large quantities of one or more intermittent 
generating technologies into electric power networks consistent with meeting reliability criteria (e.g. 
USDOE (pp. 62-67), ERCOT, NYISO).5 The technical challenges, and the associated costs, arise 
because of the production characteristics of wind, solar, and some other renewable generating 
technologies (Mount et. al.). Most conventional (fossil fueled and nuclear) generating technologies are 
“dispatchable.” This means that they can be controlled by the system operator and can be turned on 
and off based primarily on their economic attractiveness at every point in time both to supply energy 
and to supply network reliability services (e.g. frequency regulation, spinning reserves). Conventional 
dispatchable generators are typically scheduled by the system operator to meet demand by dispatching 
the generators with the lowest marginal generation cost first and then moving up the “dispatch curve,” 
calling on generators with higher marginal costs until demand for energy is satisfied in real time. To 
keep things simple, and ignoring market power considerations, conventional generators are typically 
dispatched when the wholesale market price for power exceeds their short-run marginal cost of 
generation. The dispatchability of conventional generators also allows them to be scheduled well in 
advance of real time and are available to be called by system operators to supply network reliability 
services such as frequency regulation, spinning reserves, and other backup-reserves. These choices 
reflect both economic considerations (e.g. generators providing spinning reserves will typically have 
higher marginal generation costs than those dispatched to supply energy) and physical characteristics 
(e.g. ramp rates and location).  
Wind, solar and other renewable generating technologies supply electricity “intermittently” and are 
not dispatchable in the traditional sense. Electricity produced by these technologies is driven by wind 
speed, wind direction, cloud cover, haze, and other weather characteristics. As a result, they cannot be 
controlled or economically dispatched by system operators based on traditional economic criteria. The 
output of intermittent generating units can vary widely from day to day, hour to hour or minute to 
minute, depending on the technology and variations in attributes of the renewable resource that drives 
the generation of electricity at a point in time at a particular location. Rather than controlling how 
much and when an intermittent generator is dispatched, system operators must respond to what comes 
at them by calling on generators that are dispatchable to maintain network frequency and other grid 
reliability parameters.6 NERC and a number of system operators have studied the technical issues 
associated with integrating large amounts of wind and solar capacity into an electric power network. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
binding they must have the effect of increasing the price utilities would otherwise pay for wholesale electricity supplies. 
The differences between the market price and the higher price paid for renewable electricity generation passed through to 
retail consumers either in regulated bundled retail prices or in regulated distribution charges in states that have adopted 
competitive retail models. Individual states have adopted a number of other financial incentives to encourage use of 
renewable electricity sources either by utilities or by end-use consumers. 
4 Other technologies that may satisfy renewable electricity criteria include geothermal, small-scale hydro, biomass, 
methane from waste dumps, tidal power, etc. 
5 The studies are of varying quality and comprehensiveness and the estimated integration costs for wind vary by roughly a 
factor of, 5 with $10/MWh of wind generation being the highest incremental integration cost reported so far. 
6 System operators may order intermittent generators to reduce output due to transmission constraints or other network 
reliability constraints.  
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The most important technical issues and some associated analysis of the costs of maintaining network 
reliability standards with large quantities of renewable energy capacity connected to the grid are 
summarized very clearly in recent studies and reports (e.g. NERC, USDOE, ERCOT and NYISO, 
Mount et. al.). 
These studies take as given that there will be a large increase in the quantity of intermittent 
renewable energy that will be supplied in the years to come and proceed to analyze the implications 
for network operating protocols and the associated costs of balancing supply and demand in real time 
and meeting network reliability criteria. These studies do not address the more basic question of 
whether the diffusion of these intermittent renewable technologies is economical compared to 
conventional dispatchable alternatives, or if they are not, exactly how costly they are compared to 
conventional dispatchable alternatives?  
Proponents of renewable electricity generation often argue that one or another renewable 
technology is now or soon will be “competitive” or “grid competitive” with conventional generating 
technologies (or that they would be competitive if we took the value of CO2 reductions into account). 
Of course if these technologies were really less costly than conventional alternatives then there would 
be no need for subsidies and mandates. Recently announced contract prices for off-shore wind 
generation in New England of 18.7 cents/KWh (escalating at 3.5% per year) suggest that wind energy 
at these locations is roughly three times the wholesale market price for electricity at these locations in 
2009.7,8 This price is not close to being competitive with conventional dispatchable generation and is a 
costly way to reduce CO2 emissions. If wind is displacing generation from a CCGT plant in New 
England the implied cost per ton of CO2 displaced is about $300 at these contract prices,9,10 ignoring 
the additional costs of integrating wind into the New England network and the costs of non-
dispatchability discussed here.  
On the other hand, the Energy Information Administration (EIA, p. 67) recently forecast that the 
“levelized cost” of wind generation would be lower than the “levelized cost” of coal and nuclear by 
2020 and lower than the “levelized cost” of natural gas combined cycle, nuclear and coal by 2035.11 
The Wall Street Journal recently reported results (attributed to Goldman Sachs) for levelized cost 
estimates for a wider range of electricity generating technologies. See Figure 8. Based on the levelized 
cost values reported there, wind appears to be very competitive with most conventional alternatives, 
but solar has significantly higher levelized costs (Demming).12 Similar “levelized cost” calculations 
                                                     
7 The contract original price for energy supply by Cape Wind was over 20¢/Kwh with a 3.5%/year escalation and a 15-year 
contract, but after negative public reaction it was negotiated down to 18.7¢/Kwh with the same 3.5% per year escalation 
over 14 years. SNL Energy Electric Utility Report, August 16,2010, page 46, page 22 and November 29,2010, pp.24-25. 
These reported prices are much higher than the average prices paid for wind generation reported elsewhere in the U.S. 
See USDOE, page 41. 
8 The “all in” average wholesale market price in New England was about 8 cents /KWh in 2007, 10 cents/KWh in 2008, 
and 6 cents/KWh in 2009. This includes capacity payments and ancillary service charges. 2009 Annual Markets Report, 
ISO New England, May 18, 2010, page 22. http://www.iso-
ne.com/markets/mktmonmit/rpts/other/amr09_final_051810.pdf  
9 Studies of the integration of large scale wind generation in Texas and New England indicate that wind generation will 
largely displace natural gas fueled generation rather than coal fueled generation. (See ERCOT and NYISO) The CO2 
mitigation benefits are also surprisingly small in New York. Going from 1250 Mw to 8000 Mw by 2018 results in a 
reduction of only 8.5% in CO2 emissions in the electricity sector compared to the low-wind entry case. In New York, the 
electricity sector accounts for about 25% of total state CO2 emissions, so the net effect of increasing wind generation by a 
factor of 7 is a 2% reduction in state CO2 emissions from what they would otherwise be. See NYISO.  
10 Based on Joskow and Parsons (2009), Table 1 and Table 2. 
11 It is not clear from the discussion in the EIA report whether the numbers for wind include the production tax credit and 
other subsidies. 
12 One of the comparison technologies is natural gas peaking turbines. As a will discuss comparisons between an 
intermittent technology and a dispatchable technology that is built specifically to very high peak period demand during a 
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appear elsewhere in the literature for wind, various solar technologies and other renewable electricity 
technologies (e.g. Cory and Schwabe, SunPower).  
The “levelized cost” of a supplying electricity using a particular generating technology is a measure 
of the real total (capital plus operating cost) life-cycle costs per MWh supplied using that generating 
technology. It is evident from the literature comparing the economics of intermittent generation with 
conventional dispatchable generation that the “levelized cost” per MWh supplied of alternatives is the 
most widely used comparative metric. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
conveniently provides a simple on-line program that allows one to calculate the levelized cost of any 
electricity generating technology using whatever set of assumptions one chooses about capital costs, 
operating costs, fuel costs, capacity factors, etc., so that their respective levelized costs can be 
compared.13 Moreover, competitive procurement programs run by utilities to meet renewable 
electricity purchase mandates sometimes implicitly make choices based on what is effectively a 
portfolio of projects that are offered at the “least cost” per MWh supplied over the life of the 
purchased power contract --- effectively choosing projects with the lowest levelized cost per MWh 
supplied without taking into account variations in the market value of the electricity supplied.  
As already noted, the primary reasons why these levelized cost comparisons between intermittent 
and dispatchable generating technologies and the associated claims about their being “grid 
competitive” are not meaningful and lead to erroneous conclusions are (a) the value or wholesale price 
of electricity varies widely throughout the day, month and year --- by four orders of magnitude if 
capacity prices are factored in and (b) intermittent generating technologies have very different 
production profiles from the production profiles of conventional dispatchable generating technologies. 
A dispatchable generator with very low marginal generation costs (e.g. nuclear) will supply energy 
during all hours when it is available. If a wind generator were dispatchable it would run all of the time 
when it is not out for maintenance since its marginal generation cost is almost zero.14 But since its 
output depends on the speed and direction of the wind, its production is limited both as to time and 
quantity despite the fact that its marginal generating costs are effectively zero. As a result, the market 
value of the electricity supplied by intermittent generating technologies can vary widely depending 
when the electricity is produced and the production profile of intermittent generating technologies do 
not follow standard economic dispatch patterns.  
As a will show presently, an intermittent generating technology and a dispatchable generating 
technology may have the same levelized cost while simultaneously having very different net economic 
values and profitability (absent subsidies, purchase mandates, contracts that do not differentiate the 
prices paid by the time the electricity is supplied, etc.). Accordingly, choosing between offers to 
supply wind or solar energy by choosing the suppliers with the lowest levelized cost/MWh bids is 
likely to fail to lead to the selection of the highest value generating offers and increase the burden 
placed on consumers who are forced to pay for the above market costs of the associated power supply 
contracts. Such a bidding framework is also likely to distort the kinds of projects that developers of 
intermittent technologies seek to bring forward. In particular, other things equal, it will undervalue 
solar (electricity produced during the day when prices are relatively high) and overvalue wind (whose 
production is more heavily weighted to off-peak periods in many locations when prices are low). 
(Contd.)                                                                  
small number of hours in the year is not a meaningful comparison since intermittent generation cannot be relied upon to 
be available to be dispatched to meet high peak period demand during the same critical demand hours. 
13 http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_loec.html (accessed on September 6, 2010) 
14 Transmission and other network constraints may lead to curtailments of the most economical dispatchable generating 
units as well as intermittent generating units. 
Paul L. Joskow 
6 
Traditional “Levelized Cost” Comparisons 
For decades electric utilities have evaluated the economic choice between alternative generating 
technologies by comparing their expected “levelized cost” per MWh to be supplied over the life of 
each of the alternative generating technologies under consideration. As I will discuss in more detail 
presently, the “levelized cost” is essentially the expected real total cost (capital plus operating costs) 
per MWh produced over the generating unit’s expected life. The generating technology with the 
lowest expected levelized cost per unit of electricity supplied was then supposed to be chosen as the 
technology in which the utility would invest to meet a specified expected incremental demand for 
electricity.  
The use of levelized cost comparisons emerged during the period when electric generating plants 
were subject to cost-of-service regulation. Its development and use reflected a need for a fairly simple 
“rule of thumb” metric acceptable to regulators that would allow regulated firms to make and defend 
choices between long-lived generating technologies with different construction costs, different life-
cycle expected operating and maintenance costs and different expected utilization patterns. Regulators 
also specified accounting rules that defined how capital costs and operating costs of generating plants 
subject to cost of service regulation would be recovered from consumers over time (Joskow 2007). 
Evaluations of the costs of alternative generating technologies had to reflect the way in which the 
regulatory process would transform the capital and operating costs into regulated consumer prices. In 
the case of capital costs, these accounting rules defined depreciations rates, the computation of the rate 
base upon which a return on investment would be calculated, the utility’s cost of capital, the treatment 
of income taxes, etc. By applying these accounting rules to assumptions about construction and other 
capital costs, an expected stream of future “revenue requirements” associated with the return of and on 
the investment in a generating unit could be calculated. Expected future operating and maintenance 
costs would then be added to the stream of future capital charges and the total life-cycle “revenue 
requirements” associated with the plant calculated.  
Since alternative technologies had different expected construction, life-cycle operating costs and 
utilization (capacity) factors, their respective time streams of future revenue requirements differed as 
well. Accordingly, these streams of future capital and operating costs were discounted back to the 
present time to give the present discounted value of future (nominal) revenue requirements or 
regulated cash flows. To account for inflation, assumptions about general inflation that had 
(implicitly) been built into this calculation were “unbundled” and a constant real annual levelized cost 
yielding the same present value would be calculated for each technology in order to compare them on 
a common basis. This real levelized annual capital and operating cost number would then be divided 
by the expected annual output of the generating plant over its expected life and a real levelized cost 
per MWh expected to be supplied for each technology derived. The technology with the lowest 
expected levelized cost per unit of output to meet a specified increment in demand was then to be the 
investment choice made by the regulated firm. 
An example of this approach can be found in Joskow and Parsons (2009).15 They compare the real 
levelized cost per MWh for three base load generating technologies: nuclear, pulverized coal and 
natural gas combined cycle. Base load technologies are dispatched during a large fraction of the hours 
of the year, and are scheduled to be “off line” for maintenance during off-peak hours since they have 
low marginal generating costs and can be dispatched economically during a large fraction of the hours 
of the year. Joskow and Parsons (and MIT 2003) report these calculations with different assumptions 
about future fuel prices and prices for CO2 emissions. The life-cycle costs of alternative generating 
technologies under different assumptions about key operating cost variables can then be compared 
using a simple comparative “levelized cost per MWh” metric. 
                                                     
15 Updating portions of MIT (2003). 
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It should be recognized immediately that this is not the way that unregulated firms selling their 
output at market prices make investment choices. They do not calculate levelized costs and choose the 
technology with the lowest number. To oversimplify, market-based investment decisions start with 
assumptions about future output prices, output quantities and associated operating costs, taxes, etc., 
from which a stream of expected future net cash flows is derived. This stream of future net cash flows 
is then discounted back to the present using a discount rate that reflects the firm’s cost of capital or 
hurdle rate. If the present discounted value of future net cash flows exceeds the expected cost of the 
investment then the investment would be economically attractive. If the present value of future cash 
flows is less than the cost of the investment then it is economically unattractive. I will refer to this as a 
market-based evaluation mechanism. 
Historically, the traditional market-based approach could not be applied in the regulated electric 
power industry because there was no well developed wholesale power market yielding wholesale 
market prices that could profitably support investments in new merchant generating capacity.16 Indeed, 
just the opposite was the case. Investment costs, fuel costs and other operating costs determined the 
prices consumers paid through the cost of service regulatory process. Accordingly, “cost-based” 
investment evaluation protocols were a necessary feature of the regulatory process governing 
geographic electricity monopolies.  
Of course, the world has now changed. There are now active wholesale markets in which a large 
number of merchant generators which must rely on market transactions, rather than cost of service 
regulation, to provide compensation for all of their costs participate. The wholesale market prices 
produced in these markets can, in principle, be used to evaluate investment alternatives. Moreover, 
there are a few important hidden assumptions that lie behind the use of traditional levelized cost 
calculations to make comparisons between alternative conventional dispatchable generating 
technologies. Of particular importance is the implicit assumption that the generating plants being 
compared are all dispatchable and can be controlled by the system operator based on economic and 
reliability criteria. Another related implicit assumption is that the production profiles --- the hours of 
the year that the generating plant will be available --- are very similar across the technologies. For 
example “base load” investment candidates are typically compared with other “base load” candidates 
and not with peaking or intermediate load technologies. If the production profiles are the same then 
the value of the electricity supplied will be the same and the technology with the lowest levelized cost 
will also have the highest net value and would be the most profitable choice in a market context.  
However, the usefulness of simple levelized cost “rule of thumb” comparisons breaks down when 
the generating technologies being considered have different dispatch capabilities, capital/output ratios, 
and production profiles. When comparisons are made between generation technologies which are 
dispatchable by the system operator based on real time economic and reliability considerations and 
“intermittent” generation whose output is based on exogenous factors like wind and insolation and do 
not reflect traditional scheduling, economic dispatch and network reliability considerations, the value 
of the output they are expected to produce must also be taken into account along with their respective 
life cycle costs. Looking only at levelized cost comparisons tells only part of the story. Other things 
equal, the production profiles for intermittent and dispatchable generation and the value of the 
electricity they produce are likely to be very different, making comparisons based on levelized cost 
alone meaningless.  
It is especially important to get more accurate measures of the economic value of intermittent 
technologies because many intermittent technologies benefit from direct subsidies (e.g. tax credits, 
                                                     
16 Of course there have been wholesale power markets operating in the U.S. for several decades. However, these markets 
were primarily markets for “economy energy” traded between existing generating units with different marginal 
generating costs. These markets were essentially “excess energy” markets that could not provide revenues adequate to 
support the costs of investing in new generating capacity. Instead these costs were recovered through the regulatory 
process. 
Paul L. Joskow 
8 
renewable energy credits and loan guarantees) and indirect subsidies (e.g. renewable purchase 
mandates). If these technologies are truly competitive with conventional dispatchable alternatives the 
subsidies are unnecessary. If they are not, taxpayers and consumers should be aware of how much they 
are paying in hidden subsidies in an effort to force these technologies into the system. Moreover, if the 
primary motivation for promoting renewable technologies is to reduce GHG emissions, it would be 
helpful to know how much relying on these technologies costs per ton of CO2e removed. This would 
help policymakers to determine if subsidies and mandates for renewable energy technologies represent 
the least costly way to achieve GHG reduction goals. 
Simple Numerical Examples 
Let us begin with an extremely simple characterization of an electric power system. There are two 
demand periods: peak and off-peak. The peak period is 3000 hours per year and the off-peak period is 
5760 hours per year. The level of off-peak demand is 50% of the level of peak demand. Demand is 
perfectly price inelastic and there is a large existing generating capacity portfolio that is almost 
perfectly adequate to meet demand and associated RTO/ISO/NERC reliability criteria. There is a 
competitive wholesale market with peak period prices of $90/MWh and off-peak prices of $40/MWh. 
I focus on a very small incremental investments (e.g. 1 MW) so we can safely hold market prices 
constant. There are two technologies available for incremental investment. Their attributes are 
depicted in Table 1 and Table 2 along with the (assumed) associated real levelized cost per MWh for 
each technology. The attributes have been chosen so that the levelized costs of the intermittent and the 
dispatchable generating technology are virtually identical (the levelized cost of the intermittent 
generating technology is slightly lower).  
The dispatchable technology has an annualized real capital cost (real rental cost) of 
$300,000/MW/Year and real marginal operating costs of $20/MWh (think nuclear). Since market 
prices exceed the dispatchable generator’s marginal operating cost it will be dispatched whenever it is 
available. I assume that the plant must be out of service 10% of the year for maintenance and refueling 
and that these outage hours are concentrated during the off-peak period. Accordingly, the dispatchable 
generating plant runs for 7884 (capacity factor of 90% = 7884/8760) hours during the year and runs 
during all 3000 peak hours. The levelized cost is calculated as the annualized fixed cost of 1 MW of 
capacity divided by the number of MWh supplied (7884MWh/MW of capacity) plus the operating cost 
per MWh to yield a $58.1/MWh real levelized cost. 
The intermittent technology has an annualized capital cost (rental cost) of $150,000/MW/Year and 
a $0/MWh marginal operating cost (think wind). The output of the plant varies with the exogenous 
variation in the resource that drives the generator; speed and direction of the wind, insolation, tidal 
movements, etc., depending on the technology. That is, the power is supplied when the wind blows or 
the sun shines so to speak, not based on the value of the electricity produced at different hours during 
the year. The average annual capacity factor is assumed to be 30%.17  
                                                     
17 Let me note a few things about the 30% capacity factor assumption. A 30% capacity factor does not mean that in the real 
world generator runs at full capacity 30% of the time and produce nothing 70% of the time. The capacity factor is simply 
the actual generation divided by the maximum generation that would be supplied if the plant ran at full capacity during 
the entire year. For example, a wind turbine typically has a lower bound wind speed where it does not run at all (e.g. 8 
miles/hour) and an upper bound wind speed (e.g. 50 miles/hour) where it must be turned off to avoid damage (e.g. from a 
hurricane). There is a range of wind speeds where the turbine will run at full capacity. Below this “sweet spot,” output 
varies with the third power of the wind velocity. That is, if wind speed doubles output will increase by a factor of eight. 
During these hours the wind turbine is running at less than full capacity. The 30% capacity factor is a reasonable 
assumption for the average wind turbine in operation in the U.S. (USDOE) and may be a little generous (Boccard). Of 
course capacity factors for wind generation vary widely from location to location and from year to year at a specific 
location because of differences in the attributes of the wind. A typical photovoltaic facility has a much lower capacity 
factor (e.g. 15-20%) than a typical wind turbine and a much higher levelized cost. However, since the sun shines during 
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The levelized costs for these two technologies are approximately the same. So, if we were to look 
only at the levelized cost calculations, the two technologies would appear to be “competitive.” Indeed, 
the intermittent technology appears to be slightly more “competitive” than the dispatchable technology 
from this perspective. Note that the capacity factors of the dispatchable and intermittent technologies 
are quite different and the capacity factors have been incorporated directly into the calculation of the 
levelized costs. While the intermittent technology has a much lower capacity factor, the capital cost 
per unit of capacity is lower than the capital cost per MW/Year for the dispatchable technology and 
the operating costs of the intermittent technology are assumed to be zero.  
There are many arguments about the right capacity factors to use to calculate levelized costs, with 
proponents of each technology trying to drive down the claimed estimated levelized cost by assuming 
higher capacity factors than are likely to be achieved in reality for political and public perception 
purposes.18 That is, the political/public relations game has been to assume that capacity factors are 
high in order to drive down the advertised levelized cost of a particular technology so that the 
technology appears to be more competitive than it actually is likely to be.19 Adopting better methods 
for comparing the economics of different generating technologies can help to improve the level of 
discourse about them. 
Let’s return to the numerical examples. As already noted, once a dispatchable generating plant with 
the attributes assumed here is completed, it will be economical for the dispatchable technology to 
produce electricity during all hours of the year when it is available since its marginal operating cost 
per unit of output is lower than the wholesale market price in all hours of the year. Accordingly, it will 
be dispatched in all hours when it is available. Outages (e.g. for maintenance) do limit production to 
7844 hours in this example, and I have assumed for simplicity that the outages are all taken during off-
peak hours. These assumptions will be maintained in all three examples. The upper panels of tables 
3A, 3B and 3C display the revenues, costs and profitability of an incremental 1 MW investment in the 
dispatchable technology. The dispatchable technology earns enough revenue to cover all of its costs 
plus a small additional profit.  
The intermittent technology, despite the fact that the marginal cost of generation is zero, cannot be 
dispatched based on traditional economic dispatch criteria and runs, in the case of wind, based on 
exogenous variations in wind speed and direction. Let us assume in Case 1 (Table 3A) that it is windy 
at night (off-peak) but that the wind is too calm during the day (peak) to drive the turbine. The 
intermittent generator then produces electricity only during off-peak periods and only for 2628 of the 
5760 hours as limited by the wind resource that drives the turbine. This is an extreme assumption, but 
for a two period model it is not wildly inconsistent with the performance of wind generation in 
California (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).20 The revenues, costs and profitability of 1MW of “off-peak” 
wind generation is given in the second panel of Table 3A. The wind generating technology with these 
attributes does not cover its costs and exhibits a large negative profit. Thus, despite having the same 
levelized cost as the dispatchable generating technology, the economic value of the electricity supplied 
by 1 MW of these two technologies is quite different. The value of the electricity supplied by a unit of 
dispatchable generating technology is over 4 times higher than that for the intermittent generation 
technology. This is reflected as well in the profitability of the two generating technologies. A wind 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the day and electricity prices are higher during the day than at night, the value of the electricity produced by the solar 
technology may be higher than the value of the electricity produced by the wind technology.  
18 Boccard finds that actual realized capacity factors fall short of forecast capacity factors for wind generators. 
19 This observation applies to both renewable and conventional generating technologies. 
20 While the situation in California is extreme, wind generation is negatively correlated with peak demand in many other 
areas of North America including Texas, New York, and Ontario. In New York, capacity factors are much higher during 
winter months than during the peak summer months. The capacity factor for wind generated in New York during the 
peak summer hours of 2PM to 6PM was 22.9% in 2007, 16.7% in 2008, and 14.1% in 2009 (NYISO, page 95). 
Paul L. Joskow 
10 
generator with these attributes would surely require a large subsidy or selected in response to a 
renewable electricity purchase mandate since it is uneconomical.21 
Let us look at a second example with a different set of assumptions. See Table 3B. The intermittent 
generator is now assumed to run for 500 hours during the peak period (a 19% capacity factor during 
peak hours) and for 2128 hours during the off-peak period (a 37% capacity factor during off-peak 
hours).22 The attributes of the dispatchable technology are assumed to be the same, and the value of 
the electricity produced and the associated total costs are the same as in the first example as well. The 
second panel of Table 3B displays the revenues, costs and profitability for the intermittent technology. 
Shifting about 20% of the output to the peak period increases revenues, but not by enough to cover the 
intermittent generator’s total costs and investment in the intermittent technology (absent subsidies) 
still yields a negative profit 
Again the intermittent technology produces electricity with a lower value than the dispatchable 
technology and the revenue that would be earned if it sold its output at market prices does not cover its 
costs. One MW of the intermittent technology has a much lower social value than does one MW of the 
dispatchable technology despite the fact that their levelized costs are almost identical. The reason is 
that the intermittent technology produces a larger fraction of its (limited) output during low electricity 
price hours.  
For the third example we will make an extreme assumption about the output profile of the 
intermittent technology. See Table 3C. Let’s assume that the intermittent technology fortuitously 
produces all of its electricity during the peak period. This would be more plausible for a solar 
technology than for wind, though solar technologies still do exhibit intermittency. Solar thermal plants 
have much more attractive production profiles (Figure 4 --- parabolic trough technology) since the sun 
shines during the day when demand is high, though cloud cover can both reduce the level of peak 
output during the day and make it more volatile (Figure 5). Similarly for photovoltaic technology 
output varies with insolation (Figure 6 and Figure 7). So, solar technology may have a higher levelized 
cost than wind technology, but it may produce much more valuable electricity. Levelized cost 
calculations hide this important factor.  
The intermittent technology now is assumed to have a peak period capacity factor of 87%, limited 
only by the availabilty of the wind or insolation to drive the turbine. The dispatchable generator will 
operate as before and produce electricity with the same dispatch characteristics, output profile, market 
value and cost. The revenues, costs, and profitability of the intermittent generator are displayed in the 
second panel of Table 3C. In this case, if the electricity it produces were sold at market prices the 
intermittent generating technology would cover its costs and earn a substantial profit. Indeed, it would 
be substantially more profitable than the dispatchable technology characterized so far. It would also be 
profitable for the intermittent technology to enter the market without subsidies. 
The key message from these examples is that when the electricity is produced by an intermittent 
generating technology, the level of output and the value of the electricity at the times when the output 
is produced are key variables that should be taken into account in comparing intermittent technologies 
with dispatchable technologies and intermittent technologies with each other. Since wholesale 
electricity prices also vary by location, the location of the output and associated locational prices 
should also be taken into account, as would be the case for dispatchable generating technologies as 
well.  
                                                     
21 Placing a price on CO2 might change this conclusion but this could only be determined by adding assumptions about 
emissions and CO2 prices. If the dispatchable technology is nuclear then CO2 pricing would actually make the 
dispatchable technology more attractive since it would displace more existing fossil generation per MW of capacity. 
22 This is roughly equal to the peak period capacity factors for wind generators in New York, though the off-peak capacity 
factors in New York State appear to be closer to 30% than 45% (NYISO, page 95). 
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An Alternative Comparative Framework 
It should be clear that using traditional levelized cost calculations to compare dispatchable and 
intermittent generating technologies or to compare different intermittent technologies is a meaningless 
exercise and can lead to inaccurate valuations of alternative generating technologies. While levelized 
cost calculations may be a simple way accurately to compare different dispatchable base load 
generating technologies with different capital and operating cost attributes (Joskow and Parsons 
(2009)), it is not a useful way to compare generating technologies with very different production 
profiles and associated differences in the market value of the electricity they produce. When these 
kinds of comparisons are at issue, as they now frequently are given the public policy and regulatory 
pressures to increase investment in renewable energy technologies with intermittent output 
characteristics, a different set of methods is required to better understand what the true costs are for 
different generation technologies.  
A good starting point would be to evaluate all generating technologies, both intermittent and 
dispatchable, based on the expected market value of the electricity that they will supply, their total 
life-cycle costs and their associated expected profitability, rather than focusing only on the levelized 
cost per unit of output. Such an analysis would reflect the actual expected production profiles of 
dispatchable and intermittent technologies, the value of electricity supplied at different times, and 
other costs of intermittency associated with reliable network integration. That is, abandon levelized 
cost comparisons and adopt more standard economic evaluation methods for new generating capacity. 
This kind of analysis can be performed with and without direct subsidies, mandates, renewable credits, 
etc., so that the true costs of alternative technologies can be identified, the costs of the direct and 
indirect subsidies can be made transparent, and the cost per unit of CO2 displaced by different 
technologies can be easily measured. Of course, there is considerable uncertainty about future 
electricity prices and we should be skeptical about comparative technology evaluations being based on 
administrative regulatory estimates of future prices. However, merchant investors in new generating 
capacity must make estimates of future electricity prices when they evaluate investment opportunities. 
And we can use properly designed competitive procurement processes to decentralize wholesale 
market price estimates to investors while accommodating subsidies for renewable generating 
technologies, as discussed further below. 
Many system operators are already using a market-value based framework to identify technical 
issues with large scale deployment of intermittent generation and to measure the costs networks are 
likely to incur to respond to intermittency in order to maintain reliability criteria (e.g. ERCOT). This 
conceptual framework can also be used properly to measure the costs of the renewable electricity 
promotion policies that have been adopted by state and federal governments and in this way increase 
the transparency of these costs to the public. It also provides a useful conceptual framework for 
quantifying the value of adding storage capabilities to intermittent technologies and for designing 
competitive procurement programs for renewable energy that properly take account of differences in 
production profiles and the associated value of the electricity produced from plants at locations with 
different wind and solar resources.  
Finally, this approach will increase transparency about the costs of alternative generating 
technologies, the costs of subsidies provided to certain technologies, other costs of intermittency, and 
the environmental benefits of promoting technologies with subsidies, credits, and mandates that would 
not otherwise be economical choices. The increased transparency will improve public policy decisions 
and illuminate inaccuracies about costs and competitiveness advanced by interest groups promoting 
particular generation technologies to feather their own nests. 
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Other Issues 
This type of market based or electric power “systems” approach can help to illuminate other issues 
associated with the introduction of large amounts of intermittent generating capacity into electric 
power systems. 
a. Renewable Electricity Procurement: Many states with renewable electricity mandates require 
distribution utilities to run competitive solicitations to ensure that they meet their renewable energy 
procurement obligation with the “least costly” renewable technologies. The previous discussion should 
make it clear that the wrong way to organize a procurement auction for intermittent generating 
capacity would be to select the suppliers that offer the lowest price per MWh supplied without regard 
to the hours when the electricity is expected to be supplied and the associated market prices for this 
electricity. As before, the net economic value of competing projects with the same costs can vary 
widely depending on their production profiles and the value of the electricity that they supply when 
the wind blows or the sun shines. Paying less for a project that only supplies off peak power could be a 
very inefficient choice if a more costly alternative with a more economically attractive output profile 
is available.  
There is a simple conceptual way to change the structure of procurement auctions for intermittent 
generation to remedy this problem. Rather than running an auction to supply renewable energy per se, 
the auction should be based on the subsidy that will be paid to qualified renewable generators to 
supply energy when it is available. Suppliers interested in participating in the auction would bid the 
subsidy that they are willing to accept for a specified level of output if they are chosen to receive a 
contract through the auction. The subsidies per MWh supplied bid into the auction by different project 
are ordered from lowest to highest. The procurement auction then selects the projects with the lowest 
subsidy bids that in the aggregate meet the procurement quantity target. The subsidy bid by the 
marginal bidder that just misses being selected then determines the subsidy per MWh supplied that 
each of the winning bidders will receive. The renewable generators are then free to make their own 
commercial arrangements to sell the power they produce itself and will reflect the revenue they expect 
to receive from sales of their output into the market in their bids.23 The generators that can supply 
power when it is most valuable will then require a smaller subsidy than those who will supply power 
when it is less valuable, other things equal. A procurement system that separates the commercial 
arrangements for supplying the power from the contractual arrangements to provide subsidies for what 
the renewable generators actually produce will lead to more efficient choices of suppliers than a naïve 
“least cost” auction that ignores differences in production profiles and the wide differences in the 
value of electricity at different times. 
b. Storage: If we compare Table 3A with Table 3C we see immediately that storage capacity would 
be very valuable in locations where the renewable resource has the attribute that it drives the generator 
mostly off-peak. At the extreme, if storage could shift all of the generation from an intermittent 
generator from the off-peak period to the peak period, the value of the electricity supplied would 
increase by a factor of four in the example. However, if procurement programs do not incorporate the 
value of electricity produced at different times, renewable generators will have no incentive to add 
storage capacity to their projects. 
c. Consistency with Analyses of Grid Integration Issues: The approach taken here is completely 
consistent with ongoing analyses of operational issues associated with large scale scale integration of 
intermittent technologies into electric power networks, the associated incremental costs, and 
implications for pricing network reliability services (e.g. frequency regulation and spinning reserves), 
redispatch costs, output constraints resulting from transmission constraints (including those placed on 
wind), and capacity values (e.g. based on the expected capacity factor during the few highest peak 
                                                     
23 Of course, whether and how they will do so depends on many other attributes of a renewable energy procurement 
auction. 
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hours of the year rather than nominal capacity or average capacity factors). The analyses of these 
issues requires a systems approach that carefully takes into account output profiles, required response 
speeds to match supply and demand in real time, accuracy of day-ahead forecasting of output, etc. The 
analyses of these issues performed by ERCOT is an excellent example of how this kind of study can 
be done. The tools used by ERCOT to examine these operational issues can easily be applied as well 
to evaluate the more basic questions about the economics of investing in alternative generating 
technologies discussed here. 
d. Production Tax Credits: Qualifying renewable generating units now receive a production tax 
credit of 2.1 cents/KWh (indexed to inflation) from the federal government. This tax credit is earned 
regardless of the time the electricity is actually produced or its economic value. This is an inefficient 
way to subsidize renewable energy because it does not provide incentives for intermittent generators to 
choose locations, schedule maintenance, etc. in a way that maximizes the value of the electricity 
produced. A tax credit that is high for supplies provided during peak hours and low for supplies 
provided during off-peak hours would provide better incentives and increase the net economic value of 
renewable energy investments. 
e. Other Incentive Issues: It is clear from the comprehensive studies examining economic and 
reliability issues resulting from large scale expansion of intermittent generation (e.g. NYISO, ERCOT, 
NERC) that its reliable integration into electric power networks will increase costs related to 
frequency regulation, spinning reserves, transmission congestion and investment, redispatch, and 
backup capacity costs. The magnitude of these costs will no doubt continue to be debated. However, it 
is essential that these additional costs get factored into prices charged to intermittent generators for 
grid reliability services, redispatch and backup capacity to provide appropriate incentives for more 
efficient investment in intermittent technologies. Our ability to use proper prices incentives to 
efficiently guide investment decision, including the location, type, and capacity of intermittent 
generation entering the market is unfortunately limited by quantitative mandates to purchase minimum 
quantities of intermittent generation regardless of their economic merits. Relying instead on pricing 
CO2 emissions combined with proper pricing of grid services and backup capacity (through proper 
capacity payment mechanisms) would yield superior economic and environmental outcomes. 
Table 1 
Hypothetical Levelized Costs Comparison 
     Base Load    Intermittent 
 
 
Construction + Fixed O&M Cost  $300,000/MW/Year   $150,000/MW/Year 
(levelized/MW/year) 
 
Operating Cost    20.0¢/KWh    0¢/KWh 
(levelized/MWh) 
 
Capacity Factor   90%     30% 
 
MWh/MW/year   7884     2628 
 
Levelized cost/MWh   $58.1/MWh    $57.1/MWh  
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Table 2 
Hypopthetical Peak and Off-Peak Attributes 
Peak period:  
 Hours:   3000 
 
 Price (levelized):  $90/MWh 
 
Off-peak period: 
 
 Hours:   5760 
 
 Price (levelized):  $40/MWh 
Table 3A 
Hypothetical Valuations of Intermittent and Dispatchable Generation 
with the Same Levelized Cost 
Case 1 
Dispatchable MWh supply: 
 Peak:   3000 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  4884 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $465,360/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $457,680/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $7,680/MW/year 
 
Intermittent MWh supply: 
 
 Peak:   0 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  2628 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $105,120/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $150,000/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   -$44,880 
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Table 3B 
Hypothetical Valuations of Intermittent and Dispatchable Generation 
with the Same Levelized Cost 
Case 2 
Dispatchable MWh supply: 
 Peak:   3000 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  4884 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $465,360/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $457,680/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $7,680/MW/year 
 
Intermittent MWh supply: 
 Peak:   500 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  2128 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $130,120/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $150,000/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   -$19,880/MW/year 
Table 3C 
Hypothetical Valuations of Intermittent and Dispatchable Generation 
with the Same Levelized Cost 
Case 3 
Dispatchable MWh supply: 
 Peak:   3000 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:  4884 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $465,360/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $457,680/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $7,680/MW/year 
 
Intermittent MWh supply: 
 Peak:   2628 MWh 
 
 Off-peak:   0 MWh 
 
 Revenues:  $236,520/MW/year 
 
 Costs:   $150,000/MW/year 
 
 Profit:   $ 86,520/MW/year 
Paul L. Joskow 
16 
Figure 1 
Top 5% of Real Time Energy (only) Prices in the PJM RTO24 
 
State of the Market Report for PJM 2009, Monitoring Analytics, LLC (Independent Market Monitor 
for PJM), Volume 2, page 64, March 11, 2016  
Figure 2 
 
Source: NERC (2009), p.16 
                                                     
24 Note that this excludes capacity payments and payments for ancillary services. 
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Figure 3 
California Wind Generation During 2006 Heat Wave 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 37. 
Figure 4 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 26. 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 26 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 28 
Comparing the Costs of Intermittent and Dispatchable Electricity Generating Technologies 
19 
Figure 7 
 
Source: NERC (2009), page 28 
Figure 8 
 
As printed in The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2010, page R4. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703846604575447762301637550.html# 
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